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Reform of the global ﬁ  nancial architecture:
a new social contract between society and ﬁ  nance
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Chief Risk Ofﬁ  cer and Member of the Management Board
Deutsche Bank
The current global crisis poses signiﬁ  cant challenges for our ﬁ  nancial system, our economies, and our 
societies. Overcoming these will require a new “social contract” between society and ﬁ  nance. This must 
include improvements to corporate governance, a reform of capital requirements, a more transparent and 
less procyclical accounting framework, banking laws to reﬂ  ect modern ﬁ  nancial markets, better infrastructure, 
and stronger supervision. Given the global nature of today’s capital markets, it will also require efforts to be 
coordinated, if not harmonised, internationally in order to avoid any re-fragmentation and re-nationalisation 
of the ﬁ  nancial system. Addressing these challenges is essential to creating a ﬁ  nancial framework that can 
support prosperous growth in the coming decades. 
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1| LEARNING FROM THE PAST
It is exactly 75 years ago that a new US administration 
enacted sweeping regulatory changes to America’s 
ﬁ  nancial markets. When US President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt said in his inauguration speech, 
that there is “nothing to fear but fear itself”, he 
set not only the tone for his ﬁ  rst year in ofﬁ  ce but 
also marked the turning point of the economic and 
ﬁ  nancial crisis at the time.
Roosevelt had understood that a return of 
economic, ﬁ  nancial and political stability would 
require co-ordinated action on several fronts: ﬁ  rst, 
a stabilisation of the banking system, the basis 
for which was laid by the Emergency Banking 
Act. The Act allowed for the closure of insolvent 
banks and the re-opening of sound banks after a 
thorough assessment of their health. Second, the 
Federal Reserve reversed its monetary policy course 
and began to expand the monetary base. Third, 
upon request of the Roosevelt administration, 
the US Congress embarked on a programme of 
ﬁ  scal expansion. Fourth, and most crucially, the 
Roosevelt administration recognised that all of the 
afore-mentioned measures would be futile if trust 
in the ﬁ  nancial system was not restored. And as 
the private ﬁ  nancial sector had lost the necessary 
credibility to establish this trust by itself, there was 
no alternative but to take political action. 
Efforts to restore trust had, in fact, already started 
in the previous year with the investigations into the 
causes of the 1929 stock market crash. The hearings, 
which unearthed evidence of wide-spread market 
abuse, paved the way for the 1933 Securities Act. 
Together with the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which 
created the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), it restored market conﬁ  dence by providing 
investors and the stock exchanges with more reliable 
information and clear rules for transparent and 
fair dealing in securities. Similarly, the Banking 
Act of June 1933, co-authored by Sen. Glass and 
Rep. Steagall, not only enshrined the separation of 
commercial and investment banking, but also created 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
in an effort to bolster depositors’ trust in the banking 
system. The institutional structure of supervision, 
too, was changed, when the Federal Reserve 
assumed supervisory powers for the ﬁ  rst time. Thus, 
in essence, the Banking Act was the institutional 
reinforcement of the measures Roosevelt had taken 
immediately upon assuming ofﬁ  ce in March 1933. 
In fact, the institutional legacy of the actions taken by 
the ﬁ  rst Roosevelt administration shaped US ﬁ  nancial 
markets for decades and provided the foundation 
for solid growth after the Second World War.
2| RESTORING TRUST AND 
  REVIVING PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS
Why this excursion into economic history? 
Essentially, because it provides an insight into the 
fundamental importance of trust as the basis for any 
effort to restore the stability of the ﬁ  nancial system 
and ﬁ  nancial institutions. Stabilising banks, easing 
monetary policy and the use of public money are 
all necessary elements for overcoming a systemic 
banking crisis. But necessary though they are, they 
alone are not sufﬁ  cient. Roosevelt’s reformist agenda 
in essence created a new “social contract” between 
society and bankers. Banks as private institutions 
were allowed to manage citizens’ money and wealth 
provided they agreed to oversight and supervision 
by the government. This new “social contract” 
established the trust necessary for deposits to return 
to banks and investors to buy shares again.  
Today, our challenge is not that different. A brief 
glimpse at the scope of the problem illustrates why: 
If, as some fear, losses for the ﬁ  nancial system from 
the current crisis will, in the end, really amount to up 
to USD 4 trillion, this would clearly overwhelm the 
ability of public budgets to recapitalise the banking 
system. Put differently, in order to stabilise the 
ﬁ  nancial system, a sufﬁ  cient level of trust must be 
restored that allows for a return of private capital 
into the ﬁ  nancial system. Only when the holders 
of the more than USD 100 trillion of ﬁ  nancial assets 
worldwide are willing again to put their funds at 
risk (rather than keeping it in cash and government 
securities) will ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows normalise and stability 
return. 
It is this philosophy that, in my view, is the underlying 
rationale of the latest US plans to deal with illiquid, 
hard-to-value assets on the balance sheets of US banks. 
As the purchase of these assets by the state alone is 
not feasible, it is sensible to leverage public funds 
with private capital to deal with the problem. 
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However, drawing lessons from the Great Depression 
does not mean that we should copy blindly the 
legislation of the 1930s. In my view, it would be a 
mistake to replicate the separation of commercial 
and investment banking – notwithstanding the fact 
that some observers currently (like Nobel Prize 
winner Edmund Phelps) suggest doing so. Indeed, 
stand-alone investment banks were actually the 
ﬁ  rst victims of this crisis. Investment banks per se 
were not the cause of the current ﬁ  nancial turmoil. 
The world needs their capacity for underwriting debt 
and equity products and market-making/trading 
of ﬁ  nancial instruments. The crisis was caused by 
large proprietary positions, regulatory arbitrage, 
considerable funding mismatches and a complete 
failure of corporate governance in several banks.
Consequently, calls for a return to a split banking 
system or for the introduction of a “narrow” banking 
system are misplaced. These concepts would create 
signiﬁ  cant welfare losses without addressing the 
underlying causes of the crisis. Similarly, turning 
the banking industry into a utility – tightly regulated 
and subject to stringent product and pricing caps – 
would entail a re-nationalisation of banking markets, 
obliterating decades of work in efﬁ  ciency and market 
integration. Thus, in our quest for more stable and 
resilient structures for global ﬁ  nancial markets, we 
need not only to ﬁ  nd solutions that are appropriate 
to the realities of our times, but also reinstate the 
“social contract” that was broken by the ﬁ  nancial 
industry in the last two years.
3| EFFORTS TO REDESIGN 
  THE REGULATORY SYSTEM 
  CAN BUILD ON SOUND BASIS
Fortunately, there is no lack of blueprints for 
reforming the international financial system. 
A number of reports have been issued by public 
sector bodies over recent months1, which provide a 
wide range of measures considered appropriate to 
forestall a recurrence of such problems in the future. 
The private sector welcomes and essentially supports 
the recommendations set out in these reports. 
They are appropriate measures to re-establish trust 
and functioning markets. Simultaneously, the private 
sector has also presented a great number of proposals.2 
It is noteworthy and, indeed, very welcome that 
there is a large overlap between all these reports 
and a broad agreement between the ofﬁ  cial and 
the private sector on the areas in need of change. 
All reports identify the need for reforms in the areas 
of risk and liquidity management, transparency, 
market infrastructure, capital requirements and 
remuneration practices. This not only reﬂ  ects a 
broad consensus on the causes of the crisis, but also 
represents the fruits of efforts made in recent years at 
intensifying the dialogue between the private sector 
and regulators. From this dialogue, a broad agreement 
has developed on a regulatory philosophy based on 
the central tenets of principles-based and risk-based 
supervision. 
4| BANKS’ CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
  AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
  NEEDS UPGRADING
Appropriately, banks’ internal governance structures 
and risk management are at the heart of the 
recommendations listed in the afore-mentioned 
reports. The crisis revealed the need for clear 
improvements in these areas, such as risk management 
independence in all parts of the bank and increased 
responsibilities for Management Boards. Boards 
need to decide on the risk appetite, which should 
be based on the ﬁ  rm’s loss tolerance, and need to 
be involved in the continuous monitoring of risk 
positions. This implies a more rigorous selection 
process for Senior Managers and the need for them 
to have frequent and transparent information on the 
ﬁ  rm’s risk positions.
1  The most important documents have been the Action Plan issued by the Financial Stability Forum (April 2008), the G20 communiqué (November 2008), 
the Larosière report (March 2009), and the Turner report (April 2009).
2  Amongst them the report of the IIF’s Committee on Market Best Practices (July 2008), the third report of the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group 
(August 2008), and the Group of Thirty report (January 2009).
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This, in turn, is only achievable if banks have robust 
information technology (IT) systems in place that 
allow for real-time and group-wide aggregation of 
risk positions. At Deutsche Bank for instance, the 
IT infrastructure that we have built up in recent years 
— including a ‘golden source’ for all risk positions 
and parameters — proved to be invaluable during 
this crisis, as it enabled us to continuously aggregate, 
report and manage our positions. The industry as a 
whole needs much better IT systems, which have to 
include global ﬁ  rm-wide data warehouses in order 
to capture all risks. Data accuracy and completeness 
should be audited, and all risk models and stress tests 
regularly back-tested. Banks also need to invest in 
their stress testing systems: stress tests need to be 
systematic and standardised and must integrate all 
tests as is already being done in Economic Capital 
calculations. 
The need for continuous and improved stress testing 
equally applies to liquidity management, where it 
turned out that the stress scenarios used were not 
extreme enough. While better stress tests address one 
of the severe deﬁ  ciencies in many banks’ liquidity 
management, the crisis also demonstrated the need 
for strategic liquidity reserves. Such reserves should 
cover on- as well as off-balance sheet funding needs 
for at least two months. As an example, since the start 
of the crisis Deutsche Bank has put signiﬁ  cant effort 
into systematically building up a strategic liquidity 
reserve. At year-end 2008, this reserve amounted 
to more than EUR 57 billion, which, by and large, 
covers all short-term liabilities.
However, improving governance and risk 
management is not only a function of technical 
infrastructure and improved processes. Sound risk 
management can only be achieved with experienced 
and well-trained staff — which is, in my view, another 
important lesson to be learned from this crisis. Apart 
from a deep understanding of the risks employees take 
and manage, they have to be familiar with accounting 
and regulatory rules as well. Consequently, mandatory 
training programs for every risk ofﬁ  cer should be 
considered. At Deutsche Bank, we have addressed 
this, among other initiatives, by a comprehensive 
training program including mandatory accounting 
seminars for risk managers. Enabling easy career 
transfers between front and back ofﬁ  ce is a further 
crucial element. It should go hand-in-hand with a 
harmonisation of compensation levels between front 
and back ofﬁ  ce.
A lot has already been said and written about the 
need to reform the ﬁ  nancial industry’s compensation 
policies. As outlined in the recently published 
Institute of International Finance (IIF) Principles, 
compensation should be performance oriented, 
aligned with shareholders’ interests, long-term in 
nature, risk-adjusted with claw-back features, and 
transparent to all stakeholders in order to avoid 
excessive risk taking.
Thought should also be given to how the current 
proposals and enhancements will be implemented 
in financial institutions and how this will be 
monitored going forward. A potential solution 
could be that International Capital Adequacy 
Assessment Process (ICAAP) formally certiﬁ  es all risk 
management processes. Given the banks’ importance 
for the economy as a whole, such certiﬁ  cations would 
be justiﬁ  ed in the same way our societies request the 
certiﬁ  cation of the safety of drugs, food and nuclear 
power plants, etc. 
5| REFORMING CAPITAL 
  REQUIREMENTS
Apart from risk management, capital levels in the 
banking industry form an essential part of the 
debate. The crisis revealed that the capital levels 
held by many banks were not commensurate with 
the level of risk. There is a clear message that banks 
individually, and the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole, 
need to hold more and better quality capital. Banks 
should also ensure they have a large cushion of 
contingent capital reserves that can be converted 
during a downturn.3 
Also, modiﬁ  cations must be made to the capital 
adequacy framework for Market Risk. At Deutsche 
Bank, we hold for Market Risks around 4-5x more 
Economic Capital than regulatory capital. Whilst 
insufﬁ  cient capital levels are punitive during a 
crisis, they are even worse during good times since 
they allow the build up of oversized risk positions. 
The proposals of the Basel Committee for Banking 
3  Contingent capital = senior bank debt with a conversion option to sub-debt.
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Supervision to substantially increase capital levels for 
sales and trading are thus a logical step in the right 
direction. They will also prevent capital arbitrage 
between the trading and banking books as these 
proposals will entail higher capital requirements for 
securitisations and for credit risk in trading books. In 
my view, these are appropriate adjustments.
In recent months, increased attention has been 
paid to the concept of a minimum leverage ratio. 
While a simple leverage ratio represents only a 
very crude instrument to measure risks, it would 
nevertheless lead banks to put increased focus on 
(the growth of) their balance sheets. Had such a 
minimum requirement been in place before the 
crisis started, the failures of banks whose sheer 
balance sheet size contributed to their collapse might 
have been avoided.
6| ADDRESSING PROCYCLICALITY
Given the inherent cyclical nature of financial 
markets, there is a fundamental conceptual issue 
that needs to be solved: how to address the issue 
of procyclicality that is a logical concomitant of 
any risk-sensitive capital framework. While risk 
sensitivity is an appropriate tool to control risk at the 
level of the individual ﬁ  rm, if not properly designed 
it creates undesirable systemic implications when all 
institutions covered by such rules simultaneously 
aim to raise capital, reduce their risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) and exit from trading positions. 
There are four signiﬁ  cant procyclical elements in 
today’s regulatory framework:
￿ value-at-risk (VaR) based capital requirements for 
market risks;
￿ credit rating based capital requirements for credit 
risks (Basel II);
￿  fair value accounting of illiquid products 
under both US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles  (GAAP) and International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS);
￿  procyclical reserve requirements under both 
US GAAP and IFRS.
The interaction of these four components contributed 
signiﬁ  cantly to the downward asset price spiral that 
we have experienced since the outbreak of the crisis. 
Although the correction of these deﬁ  ciencies will 
require a lot more detailed work, conceptually these 
issues are relatively easy to address.
6|1  VaR based market risk capital 
requirements
Instead of taking the average of the last ~250 trading 
days, which makes VaR volatile and understates 
the risk after long periods of benign markets, VaR 
could be calibrated using the most extreme price 
movements over, let’s say, the last twenty years.
6|2  Credit rating based capital 
requirements
Equally, instead of calibrating the Basel II credit risk 
charge by using averaged credit data of the last ﬁ  ve 
years, it could be calibrated by taking the default and 
recovery rates from the last three recessions.
6|3  Fair value accounting of illiquid 
products
If the accounting treatment for holding asset were 
based on “capacity to hold” rather than “intention 
to hold”, investment portfolios could no longer be 
held in the trading books and would have to be 
ﬁ  nanced to ﬁ  nal maturity. This would not only 
address the maturity mismatches but also alleviate 
the pressure to sell when short-term ﬁ  nancing is no 
longer available. 
6|4  Procyclical reserve requirements
The current reserve requirements, which are based 
on observable events, could be replaced by dynamic 
provisioning which is based on expected events in 
the future; such dynamic reserves should also be 
tax-deductible.
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At this point in time, only stress-based VaR and 
dynamic credit provisioning are under discussion 
by regulators and supervisors. Much more work 
still needs to be done to address all procyclical 
factors in our accounting and regulatory regime. 
It is understood that instruments such as dynamic 
provisioning would have to be accompanied by 
stringent disclosure requirements in order to prevent 
their misuse for manipulating ﬁ  nancial statements. 
Last but not least, even if all the above issues are 
addressed simultaneously, the ﬁ  nancial system 
will remain cyclical. To dampen the cycles, a more 
stability-focused monetary policy is required to 
mitigate ﬁ  nancial imbalances and asset bubbles. 
7| ESTABLISHING 
  MACROPRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
Addressing procyclicality in the design of regulatory 
and risk management systems requires methodical 
and comprehensive monitoring of systemic risk. In 
recent years, ﬁ  nancial supervision has primarily 
focused on microprudential supervision, looking at 
the health of individual ﬁ  nancial institutions, but has 
neglected the aspect of macroprudential supervision, 
i.e. the monitoring of the health of the ﬁ  nancial 
system as a whole and the identiﬁ  cation of threats 
to ﬁ  nancial stability. 
Last but not least, the threats to global ﬁ  nancial 
stability that were bound to result from the build-up 
of severe macroeconomic ﬁ  nancial imbalances were 
noticed and widely commented upon, but did not 
lead to any concrete policy action aimed at reducing 
these imbalances.
There is now a broad consensus that macroprudential 
supervision must assume a more prominent role in the 
set-up of ﬁ  nancial supervisory regimes. In fact, in both 
the United States and the European Union, proposals 
have been put forward for establishing “systemic 
risk supervisors”. In the United States, it is widely 
suggested that the Federal Reserve System (Fed) 
assumes this role. In the European Union, the 
Larosière report proposes the establishment of a 
European Stability Risk Council (ESRC) under the 
auspices of the European Central Bank (ECB).
The current crisis has revealed that in a globally 
integrated market, ﬁ  nancial instability is quickly 
transmitted from one market to another. There 
is therefore a need for supplementing the new 
macroprudential supervisory structures in the 
United  States and the European Union with 
appropriate structures for coordination at the global 
level. The Financial Stability Board is the natural 
location for this. 
8| FINE-TUNING 
  MICROPRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
While there is a need to establish macroprudential 
supervision, it will only be effective if it is 
translated into concrete action at the political and 
microprudential level. 
First, supervision needs to be comprehensive and 
extended to all market participants and infrastructures. 
Market participants not regulated in the past, such 
as asset-backed commercial paper funds, structured 
investment vehicles, money market funds, hedge 
funds, private equity, mortgage originators and 
financing companies must be brought into the 
regulated system. 
Second, supervision must be risk-weighted. 
It must follow a risk-based approach where scarce 
supervisory resources are directed to the greatest 
risks. This would mean that large, important ﬁ  nancial 
institutions — such as Deutsche Bank — need to be 
more intensively supervised than smaller market 
participants. We welcome this intensiﬁ  ed supervision 
as it is in our genuine self-interest that other 
systemically relevant participants are supervised 
appropriately. 
At the other end of the spectrum, hedge funds, 
which – contrary to perception – have not caused 
this crisis, could be regulated lightly. The Financial 
Services Authority (FSA)’s approach to require the 
registration of hedge fund managers, to subject 
funds to information requirements and intensive 
monitoring of their ties with prime brokers, is a very 
reasonable one and has rightly been commended by 
the Larosière report.
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Third, effective microprudential supervision is 
only feasible if regulators are given the right set of 
enforcement tools. These tools should be reasonably 
differentiated and incentivise ﬁ  nancial institutions 
to automatically comply with rules and regulations. 
For example, the voluntary correction of self-identiﬁ  ed 
and self-notiﬁ  ed breaches should be rewarded, while 
breaches that are not notiﬁ  ed should be penalised. 
With such a set of enforcement tools, banks would 
build a self-policing culture, which would be more 
efﬁ  cient than just a system of checks and controls. 
Fourth, prudent supervision on a micro level also 
requires a coordinated approach and an improved 
exchange of information between supervisors 
(colleges). Here again, the Larosière report points 
in the right direction with the proposal of a European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS).
9| STRENGTHENING 
  MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 
A further element to bolster the resilience of the 
global ﬁ  nancial systems is the strengthening of 
market infrastructure. This is not just an issue 
of greater efﬁ  ciency; rather, it is one of ﬁ  nancial 
stability. The ﬁ  nancial infrastructure for settling 
and clearing of payments, securities and derivatives 
must be able to act as a shock absorber. It must allow 
the system to withstand the failure of major market 
participants. Unfortunately, however, most of our 
market infrastructure dates back to the times of 
nationally fragmented markets and to the days of 
unsophisticated, low volume markets. Clearly, such 
structures are no longer adequate.
Fortunately, we are not starting from scratch here. 
Major progress along these lines has already been 
achieved as regards the clearing of credit default 
swap (CDS) contracts. This goes back to an initiative 
by the New York Fed, but the implementation has 
been a private sector effort, with Deutsche Bank 
playing a leading role.
Comparable efforts would be sensible in other 
market segments, such as FX trading and payment 
services. Indeed it can be argued that such key 
market infrastructures should be structured in a 
way that insulates them from the potential troubles 
of any single market participant, especially those 
that are systemically important. To achieve this, 
system designs that rely on CCP-type4 structures 
are useful. In addition, keeping the bankruptcy of 
network structures remote from market participants 
can serve a similar purpose. Incidentally, this does 
not mean that such infrastructures must be run as 
public utilities; but it does mean that they must 
be organised in a way that prevents a negative 
spill-over from other, unrelated market segments into 
vital, shared infrastructures of the ﬁ  nancial system. 
In many societies, railway networks or power grids 
are already managed in a similar way.
Although often neglected, the need to improve 
ﬁ  nancial market infrastructure extends beyond 
clearing, settlement and payment networks: the 
outbreak of the ﬁ  nancial crisis revealed that the 
market infrastructure for the trading and pricing of 
complex ﬁ  nancial instruments has not kept pace with 
market developments. Innovative structured products 
were introduced to the market, but many participants 
lacked the ability to price these correctly and to 
monitor the risk contained therein. This inability led 
them to rely on external judgements – speciﬁ  cally 
the opinion of rating agencies – rather than on their 
own judgement. This ignored the simple rule that 
ratings can only be a complement for one’s own risk 
assessment, not a substitute. 
The markets for these products will only revive 
if investors regain conﬁ  dence in their investment 
decisions. Markets and their participants need reliable 
price signals and a robust pricing infrastructure. 
For this to happen, we need to have a pooling of 
information on transaction volumes and prices. We 
also need transparency on the underlying assets of 
structured products, so that investors and supervisors 
are able to perform their own risk assessment. 
Relevant information should be publicly available 
and regular updates should be mandatory. With today’s 
internet, such information could be easily made 
available online.
In addition to better disclosure, higher standardisation 
is required. It will reduce complexity in structured 
4  CCP = Central Counterparty
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credit markets and would help to increase transparency 
and stability. Standardisation is also conducive to 
greater market liquidity, which, in turn, would make 
it more likely that market prices are available even 
in a difﬁ  cult market environment. A comparison 
with the market for Pfandbriefe (covered bonds) 
may be instructive: overall, this market segment has 
fared better than securitisations due to the greater 
transparency, liquidity, uniformity of products and 
longer track-record that mark these products. 
We are still in the middle of a global crisis that is generally accepted as being the most severe since the 
1930s. It poses signiﬁ  cant challenges for our ﬁ  nancial system, our economies, and our societies. 
To overcome this crisis, we need a new “social contract” between society and ﬁ  nance. This contract has 
to be simple and easy to understand, provide certainty to ﬁ  nancial markets and safety for the money that 
our citizens put into ﬁ  nancial institutions. It has to address the root causes of the current crisis and provide 
the basis for a fundamental reform of the way the industry does business. 
Such a contract has to include far-reaching measures like: improving banks’ corporate governance; making 
the accounting framework more transparent, consistent and less procyclical; adjusting the banking laws to 
the realities of modern ﬁ  nancial markets; and strengthening supervision that is both effective and efﬁ  cient. 
Ensuring we have a sound market infrastructure will also serve as a further shock absorber for our ﬁ  nancial 
markets.
All these areas must be addressed simultaneously and we must thoroughly communicate our intention to 
put ﬁ  nancial markets on a new footing for our citizens and market participants. Given the global nature of 
today’s capital markets, these efforts have to be coordinated, if not harmonised, internationally in order to 
avoid any re-fragmentation and re-nationalisation of the ﬁ  nancial system.
Just as the Roosevelt administration eventually succeeded more than seventy years ago, there is no doubt 
that this current generation is able to develop a new ﬁ  nancial framework that will support prosperous growth 
for the decades to come.
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